Understanding the multidimensionality of religion in the context of religious extremism will help in accurately depicting this phenomenon, and will facilitate understanding by scholars of the complex group processes associated with religious change, which have been neglected to date.
SW conceived of the presented idea. The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest. We would like to thank Joshua Rhee, Zahra Mirnajafi, and Sam Popple for helpful editing suggestions on earlier versions of the manuscript. Altemeyer, B. Authoritarianism, religious fundamentalism, quest, and Prejudice. Arena, M. Social psychology, terrorism, and identity: a preliminary re-examination of theory, culture, self and society.
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Liht, J. Religious fundamentalism: an empirically derived construct and measurement scale. Moghaddam, F. The staircase to terrorism: a psychological exploration. Muhtadi, B. The quest for Hizbut Tahrir in Indonesia. Asian J. Nurhayati, A. These strategic partnerships are critical to containing the threat and limiting its impact outside the countries where it is now centered. Second, the need for lasting strategic partnerships with Muslim states is reinforced by key demographic trends on a global basis.
Work by the Pew Research Center estimates that the total number of Muslims will increase from 1. Dividing the world on a religious basis, or even seriously alienating a substantial portion of the world's Muslims could create all too real a clash between key elements of the global population and economy. The trend charts in this section reinforce the points made in the previous sections about the enduring threat that extremism and instability poses to the Islamic world and the state outside it.
When they are compared to the previous trend data on incidents and deaths, they show that Al Qaida, ISIS, the Taliban, and the other main targets of today's anti-terrorism and anti-extremist efforts are only a comparatively limited part of even current threats. The data in this section of this report documents major progress in fighting ISIS and a major joint military effort between a US led coalition and host country allies. It also, however, highlights the lack of any clear grand strategy to bring security and stability to Syria and Iraq.
Defeating extremist organizations like Al Qaida, ISIS, and Al Nusra will be a critical step in limiting the threat, but even near total defeat of today's major perpetrators will leave major cadres and large numbers of fighters. As yet, there are no indications that such defeats will be followed by recovery and reform efforts that will bring lasting security and stability to the divisions within Syria and Iraq shown in this section.
Extremist groups will remain, governance and economic development will be weak and divided, ethnic and sectarian differences will be critical, and the outside role of powers like Iran, Russia, and Turkey will be deeply divisive. Limited tactical victories are no substitute for a meaningful grand strategy that addresses the lasting outcome of such victories. The trend data in this section show that even tactical success is uncertain in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Again, there is no clear indication of the capability to build on the defeat of the Taliban, Haqqani Network, and other extremist groups to bring lasting security and stability to either Afghanistan or Pakistan.
The final section in the report provides a different kind of warning. It shows that the cost of failing to create effective strategic partnerships can be far greater and more destabilizing even if such partnerships only really address a limited part of a nation's tensions and divisions and focus almost exclusively on security.
Yemen is only one such case study. Libya, Somalia, the Sudans, and a number of Sub Saharan African countries already present similar challenges. Skip to main content.
Download the Report. Written By. Media Queries. In the s and s, when Great Britain, France and other European powers relinquished their colonies in the Middle East, Africa and Asia , leaders of newly sovereign Muslim-majority countries faced a decision of enormous consequence: Should they build their governments on Islamic religious values or embrace the European laws inherited from colonial rule? Invariably, my historical research shows, political leaders of these young countries chose to keep their colonial justice systems rather than impose religious law.
Newly independent Sudan, Nigeria, Pakistan and Somalia, among other places, all confined the application of Sharia to marital and inheritance disputes within Muslim families, just as their colonial administrators had done. The remainder of their legal systems would continue to be based on European law.
To understand why they chose this course, I researched the decision-making process in Sudan, the first sub-Saharan African country to gain independence from the British, in In the national archives and libraries of the Sudanese capital Khartoum, and in interviews with Sudanese lawyers and officials, I discovered that leading judges, politicians and intellectuals actually pushed for Sudan to become a democratic Islamic state.
They envisioned a progressive legal system consistent with Islamic faith principles, one where all citizens — irrespective of religion, race or ethnicity — could practice their religious beliefs freely and openly.
They chose to keep the English common law tradition as the law of the land. My research identifies three reasons why early Sudan sidelined Sharia: politics, pragmatism and demography.
Rivalries between political parties in post-colonial Sudan led to parliamentary stalemate, which made it difficult to pass meaningful legislation. So Sudan simply maintained the colonial laws already on the books. Moreover, a solid majority of U. Muslims are leery of President Donald Trump and think their fellow Americans do not see Islam as part of mainstream U.
At the same time, however, Muslim Americans overwhelmingly say they are proud to be Americans, believe that hard work generally brings success in this country and are satisfied with the way things are going in their own lives. Half of Muslim Americans say it has become harder to be Muslim in the U.
Living in a religiously pluralistic society, Muslim Americans are more likely than Muslims in many other largely Muslim-majority nations to have a lot of non-Muslim friends. Roughly two-thirds of U. By some of these traditional measures, Muslims in the U. Christians, although they are less religious than Muslims in many other nations. And about half of U. Sunnis and Shiites are two subgroups of Muslims, just as Catholics and Protestants are two subgroups within Christianity.
The Sunni-Shiite divide is nearly 1, years old, dating back to a dispute over the succession of leadership in the Muslim community following the death of the Prophet Muhammad in While the two groups agree on some core tenets of Islam, there are differences in beliefs and practices , and in some cases Sunnis do not consider Shiites to be Muslims.
With the exception of a few countries, including Iran which is majority Shiite as well as Iraq and Lebanon which are split , most nations with a large number of Muslims have more Sunnis than Shiites. In the U. Note: This post was updated on Aug. It was originally published Dec. Correction: U. In many ways, Muslim men and women see life in America differently. Muslims are religiously observant, but open to multiple interpretations of Islam. In times of uncertainty, good decisions demand good data.
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